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The Plain English Movement in the United States*
Carl Felsenfeldt
Nature of the Plain English Movement
One of the dominant events between 1975 and today in United
States consumer law was the birth of what has become known as
the "plain English movement". For centuries lawyers have been
derided for the nature of their prose. A word will not suffice
where two or even three can take its place; long sentences are
preferable to short ones; Latin, or perhaps medieval French, are
preferable to English. The plain English movement is the name
given to the first effective effort to change this and to write legal
documents, particularly those used by consumers, in a manner
that can be understood, not just by the legal technicians who draft
them, but by the consumers who are bound by their terms.
Signs of the movement surround us. Seven states have, in one
manner or another, required that consumer-oriented contracts be
written in an understandable way.1 Most of the states that have
not passed legislation have had bills to similar effect introduced. 2
Two bills have been introduced in Congress mandating plain
The following paper by Mr. Felsenfeld and the accompanying two commentaries by
Professor Cohen and Mr. Fingerhut were presented at the Eleventh Annual Workshop
on Commercial and Consumer Law held at The Faculty of Law, University of Toronto,
on October 23-24, 1981.
t Vice-President, Citibank, N.A., New York City.
1 New York, Gen. Obl. Law, Sec. 5-701; Connecticut, Pub. Act 79-532 (1979); Maine,
Laws 1979, Ch. 483; Hawaii, Act 36, 1980 Reg Sess.; New Jersey, Ch. 125, Pub. L. 1980,
N.J.S. 56:12-1; Minnesota, Laws 1981, Ch. 274; West Virginia, Laws 1981, S. B. 361.
2 Summaries of these bills appear in Felsenfeld and Siegel, Simplified Consumer Credit
Forms (Boston, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1980), Supplement No. 2, Introduction.
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English on a national level.3 Some 26 states have enacted legis-
lation specifically requiring plain English in insurance policies. 4
Where there are no statutes, we have seen a burgeoning
voluntary effort by businesses, particularly the larger ones, to
rephrase their contracts in clearer language. (The voluntary effort
has actually sparked legislatures in various states to consider
more seriously the need for statutes mandating the new expres-
sion.)
Plain English has also made its presence known outside the
contractual area. Executive Orders, both on the Presidential 5 and
gubernatorial6 levels have required that regulations be better
written. Other agencies, not subject to Executive Orders of this
sort, have undertaken voluntary efforts at considerable expense
and with laudatory results. 7
One can date the beginning of the plain English movement
with some accuracy. On January 1, 1975, Citibank of New York
introduced a plain English consumer promissory note. A team of
businessmen, lawyers and language consultants had stripped the
prior version, a dense and essentially unreadable document, of
many substantive provisions and cleansed the remaining
verbiage. Citibank knew it was on to something. The form was
introduced at a major press conference which received television
coverage. The note did indeed hit a responsive chord. It received
national, and even international, attention. It was particularly
welcomed by consumer activists who saw it as a major break-
through in terms of consumer communication. Senator William
Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, read the
note on the floor of the Senate into the Congressional Record.8
It is worth noting that this note was the result of an entirely
voluntary effort. Senator Proxmire, when he first saw the note,
asked an insightful question: "Did the Truth in Lending Act
(legislation designed to inform consumers of certain credit terms9)
make this note more difficult to draft?" The answer was yes.
3 H. R. 12212, 95th Cong.; H.R. 251,97th Cong.
4 Supra, footnote 2.
5 Pres. Exec. Order No. 12044.
6 New York Governor Carey's Executive Order No. 100, April 8, 1980.
7 See Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulations, 43 F.R. 14505, April 6, 1978; Federal
Reserve Board project, as reported in Washington Financial Reports, June 6, 1978.
8 Congressional Record, February 2, 1975.
9 P.L. 90-321,82 Stat. 146.
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There was, however, little other legislation that affected the
drafting process. Citibank has consistently maintained since then
that only in a relatively free atmosphere could this kind of accom-
plishment have been achieved.
Inevitably, a bill was introduced in the New York legislature
requiring that Citibank's contribution be mandated as a matter of
law. The bill, in fact, referred only to promissory notes and
provided that all such obligations would have to be written in the
form of the Citibank note. Citibank, understandably flattered,
nevertheless opposed the bill. Happily, it was not passed. It was,
however, soon replaced by what was subsequently enacted as the
country's first plain English law. It required that every contract of
$50,000 or less "primarily for personal, family or household
purposes" be:
1. Written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and
every day meanings; and
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.' 0
Taking the two requirements in reverse order, the mandate
that contracts be divided and captioned was clearly a derivation
from the Citibank promissory note which was set up in that form.
A disadvantage of this approach to legislation is that it makes
what worked in one case a model for all others. No evidence was
produced demonstrating that all consumer contracts should be in
this format. Not surprisingly, experience under the New York law
has strongly suggested that some contracts, particularly those
written in letter form, will have a lower communicative content
when captioned. (We will not return to the issue of division and
captions in order to dwell on the first aspect of the New York
test.)
The first requirement of the New York test is, clearly, the more
important. The bill and then the law were highly criticized,
indeed ridiculed, for the vagueness of the language standard.
How can a draftsman know what is clear or coherent or common
or everyday? What is clear to one (a lawyer, for instance) may
well not be clear to another. If the standard were related to the
understanding of a specialized group, the law could undercut its
own purpose. Surely an already overburdened court system
would become immobilized testing whether the words in
consumer contracts were common and everyday. Thus did the
10 N.Y. Gen. Obl. Law 5-702.
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critics attempt to make a mockery of the statute and reduce what
was at least the germ of a good idea to nonsense. Why the statute
did not glut the New York courts and how New York converted
its contracts from legalese to plain English with minimal turmoil
we will address at a later point.
The Movement in Context
The plain English movement of 1975-80 may be usefully
thought of as part of a longer evolution in consumer protection.
There have always been consumers and one can find statutes
protecting them back to the usury provisions of the Code of
Hammurabi. The concept of protecting the consumer through the
flow of information is probably a 20th century idea. One can
point to a number of statutes enacted within the last half century
reinforcing the concept that "the best equipped consumer is the
well informed consumer." The securities laws of the 1930's"
dictated that a company in which a person might invest fully
disclose its affairs to the public. The Retail Instalment Sales Acts
of the 1950's12 mandated disclosures to those who buy on time.
More recently, the Truth in Lending Act of 1969 required that a
uniform set of disclosures be given for all consumer credit
transactions. 13
The thrust of these statutes was informational. That is, they
required that facts be given so that a consumer about to enter into
a transaction could do so with understanding. What the statutes
lacked was a delivery mechanism. There was no assurance that
the information would arrive at and be appreciated by its
intended object. Increasingly, we have been observing a disillu-
sionment with these informationally-oriented statutes. The
accumulation of information was no guarantee of its ultimate
usefulness. In fact, as the goal of these statutes was served with
the accumulation and disclosure of more information, its very
volume made it less available to the typical consumer. The
concept became known as "information overload". 14 Too much
I See Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and 12 CFR 226.5 (a), a regulation thereunder,
requiring that all disclosures "shall be made clearly."
12 B.A. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation (Chicago, 1965), chapter IV.
13 Supra, footnote 9.
14 See Felsenfeld and Siegel, Writing Contracts in Plain English (St. Paul, West Publishing
Co., 1981), p. 41.
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information can be as bad as too little. Experts went to work on
these statutes (many are still at work) to see what could be
done. 15
The plain English movement concentrated on a different issue.
It provided a mechanism whereby information that starts here
could actually go there. The emphasis shifted from information to
communication. This is the key quality of the plain English
movement and, in all probability, the reason for its warm recep-
tion. The movement, however, immediately raised major
problems.
Issues of the Movement
The first question was whether traditional lawyer language
could be accurately rephrased in plain English, however that may
be defined. Lawyers' words were used, the argument ran,
because they produced a predictable result. If the predictability
of other words was of a lower order, lawyers understandably
would not want their clients to sustain the greater risk. Much of
the Bar was emphatic about this. While we cannot resolve all the
language issues within the space of this paper, it might be useful
to divide those issues into two parts: just bad writing and
technical writing.
By just bad writing, I mean that traditional form of lawyer-like
expression that has nothing to do with technical concepts. It is a
manner of speech that lawyers learn first in law school, reinforce
through the use of "precedent" forms in their practice and pass to
the succeeding generations as the way one "writes like a lawyer".
We can think of many examples. Sentences are simply longer
than they have to be. Words are used where they add no
meaning: witnesseth, herein, duly. Words and phrases are used
where better English equivalents are immediately available: said
or such (to indicate that a word has been used before), herein-
above, undersigned. Strings of words are used where one would
do: force and effect, sell, assign and convey, will and testament.
All of these are easily corrected. The resulting product immedi-
ately starts to look like English and is more available to the lay
reader. It is not easy, however, for the lawyer to do because it
15 The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Title VI of P.L. 96-221, March
31, 1980 was the result of considerable research done into distinctions between
disclosure and communication. See Senate Report No. 95-720, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess.
[Vol. 6
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means shaking the effects of a linguistic tradition professionally
reinforced over centuries. Most lawyers do not, in fact, know
they are writing legalese even when they do. (Lawyers have two
common failings. One is that they do not write well and the other
is that they think they do.)
Next, in dealing with lawyers' language, we face a series of
words and phrases that are technical in nature. Generally of old
English, French or Latin derivation, they stand for concepts that
lawyers, through their particular training, understand and that
laymen generally do not. The field of real estate law is particu-
larly replete with them. 16 Possibly for this reason, one finds the
real estate Bar at the forefront of opposition to the plain English
movement. One can think of such real estate words as seisin,
fixtures, appurtenances, hereditaments, among many more.
From other fields, we find parol evidence, per stirpes, demurrer,
etc., etc. Can these words be conveyed in a plain English
manner? Or is their meaning so particular that either they would
lose their effect if paraphrased or a small tome would be required
to express them?
Professor David Mellinkoff of the University of California at
Los Angeles Law School has done the most extensive research
into this subject. 17 His conclusion is that most of the words are not
nearly as precise as they appear to be. To use his metaphor, most
of the words, like soldiers, may have been in a war but not specifi-
cally in battle. That is, most of the cases dealing with those words
deal with issues surrounding them rather than with the specific
meanings of the words themselves. Research that I have done
tends to support Professor Mellinkoff's conclusion with one
qualification. Where the technical words have actually been in
battle, courts tend less to look to a technical meaning in a difficult
case than to the intent of the parties as embodied in the technical
words. In a consumer context, this leads to a dilemma. If a party
to a contract does not understand what a word means, how does
one construe his intent in using it? We know the judicial devices
for finding this: nature of the transaction, objective of the parties,
reasonable expectations etc. The technical word itself will add
little. If anything, it may be a kind of magical incantation
16 See E. Brown, "ABC's of Language Simplification", American Banker, August 14,
1978.
17 D. Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1963).
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indicating that the consumer intended this transaction to go about
the same way as similar transactions went in the past.
This difficult subject cannot be fully resolved here, nor can we
expect full resolution elsewhere until the plain English movement
has extended its span. Some additional observations may,
however, be made. First, the plain English movement is most
appropriate for consumer agreements. Thus, the technical terms
that lodge in litigation documents (demurrer, parol evidence) as
well as those that have their place in technical agreements among
corporations with legal counsel can be retained. In the consumer
context, one's conservative fears must necessarily reduce.
Experience in New York has proven that consumer agreements
can be written in a more available language and still serve their
intended goals. Even real estate documents for consumer transac-
tions in amounts below $50,000 (clearly the low end of the real
estate scale) have been effectively translated into plain English
without unexpected consequences.
One may speculate whether, in interpreting these new forms,
courts may go farther than they have in the past in looking to the
essence of an agreement and honouring the expectations of the
parties with perhaps less regard to the fine points of technical
language.18 May we even be seeing the development of two laws
of contracts, one for commercial agreements and one for
consumers? This is actually not so great a departure from existing
law which in many contexts (usury, for example 19) distinguishes
the commercial from the consumer transaction.
Assuming for the nonce, which we shall do from this point on,
that agreements can be written in "better" language, we face next
the question of whether this should be mandated by statute. We
have seen how the Citibank promissory note directly led to
statutory change in New York State. On the other hand, we have
seen that only six states have followed New York's lead. Most still
permit a free market in draftsmanship. Which route is prefer-
able?
The case made in favor of the statutes where they have been
enacted is that, first, plain English contracts are a good idea and,
18 See Martinez v. Idaho First National Bank, No. 79-1104, D. Id. (February 11, 1981),
where a court gave some words their obvious meaning despite claims that a "technical"
interpretation might have other results.
19 The chart in CCH Consumer Credit Guide, Par. 510 graphically shows distinctions made
for corporate loans.
[Vol. 6
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second, business has been too slow in adopting them. There is
much to be said for this.
The case against the statutes is somewhat more complex. The
traditional argument is that one cannot define a language
standard with sufficient clarity to measure compliance. All
contracts will be thrown into question and the courts will
eventually bog down deciding between understandability and
complexity. We have noted that this does not happen in New
York and we will return to that subject again. In my own view, a
better argument against a statutory mandate is the lawyers' unfor-
tunate use of precedent. We do not yet know the best form of
language and we probably should encourage a period of experi-
mentation until we do. Statutes tend to freeze the law. Judges
interpret them in cases and a library of what is legal and what
illegal rapidly develops. Plain English, required by statute, thus
risks becoming a new form of expression that, as interpreted by
the courts, can be as mechanical and unyielding as the language it
replaced. One would hate to see a good idea perverted in this
manner.
Another argument against the statutes is the general argument
for freedom from law. There is a sense that business is over-
regulated. We have come to believe that less law is better law.
We must not forget that the first great strides in the plain English
movement were achieved largely in the absence of controlling
law. It would be ironic if tighter regulation resulted from the
intelligent use of freedom. I will not cast my ballot in this dispute,
but rather pass to the next question: if there should be statute,
what form should it take?
A Statutory Approach
We will discuss three aspects of possible plain English legisla-
tion: language standards, government intervention and penalties.
As we shall see, the three are interrelated. An understanding of
that interrelationship and a balancing of the three elements may
be the keys to a workable plain English statute.
As to standards, they basically divide into two types. First, best
exemplified by the New York plain English law, is the so-called"subjective" standard. This consists of words with essentially
vague meanings that may be interpreted differently by different
people in different situations. In addition to the New York words
1981-821
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(clear, coherent, common, everyday), other statutes and draft
bills use a series of other descriptive words: readable, laymen's
English, reasonable men shall be able to understand, without any
need for interpretation, easily understandable, calculated to
promote understanding.
As we have already suggested, probably the most vehement
opposition of the Bar to plain English legislation was based upon
the use of standards such as these. It struck me as strange that
lawyers had apparently forgotten the myriad uses of terms like
these throughout the statutes and cases that comprise the
common law. The law of torts is based upon the concept of"reasonable" behavior. The securities laws impose the duty of"material" disclosure. Pleadings require "sufficiency" and
evidence "relevance". The use of these words in fundamental law
has resulted in the development of techniques for their applica-
tion. The competent lawyer is trained in analyzing the objectives
of a statute or the principles of a case and using them to give
meaning and application to vague words in specific situations.
One wonders whether the problems of the objecting Bar may not
have had other roots.
In contrast to the New York approach are the so-called"objective" standards. Through other disciplines and for other
purposes, a series of language tests have been devised to analyze
the complexity of language mathematically. Some 75 reputable
tests exist.2° The most famous of these is the Flesch Reading Ease
Test devised by Dr. Rudolph Flesch (incidentally, one of the
consultants on the original Citibank promissory note). 21 The test
extracts a representative sample from the text to be measured and
computes the number of words in a typical sentence. Through a
relatively simple formula, it reduces this to a number between
zero, representing the most difficult form of expression, to 100,
representing the easiest. A score of 85 for example, means that
the text is very easy; 15 represents great difficulty. Most of the
insurance statutes already referred to incorporate the Flesch test
as a standard and typically require a reading score of between 40
and 60.
Other tests use other ingredients of the text. Some are based
20 G. A. Klare, The Measurement of Readability (Iowa State University Press, 1963), and
"Assessing Readability", 1 Reading Research Q. 63 (1974-5).
21 R. Flesch, The Art of Readable Writing (Harper & Row, 1949).
[Vol. 6
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upon syllables; some relate words used to a given vocabulary list
and design scores based upon the difficulty of those words.
There are several problems with the language tests. One is that
they were really devised for reading materials in the elementary
schools and no systematic study has been done on their applica-
bility to such materials as contracts or, for that matter, the
reading ability of mature adults. 22 Second, under most of the
tests, gibberish can score as well as clear writing. For example,
the following two sentences would have identical Flesch scores:
I went to the park.
Park I to the went.
Writing with a Flesch or other score as a standard, rather than
simply seeking understandability, creates its own problems. One
can try to squeeze words, like Cinderella's sisters' feet, into shoes
of unyielding size. Testing language after it is written may have its
benefits. Using a test in the writing process is a very different
matter. Some who have done this reported to me that it was
occasionally necessary to reduce clarity in order to fit sentences
into the confines of a language score. The testing system does,
however, seem advantageous to those who are looking for
security.
Another method of achieving certainty brings us to the second
element of a possible language statute, government intervention.
Particularly where the subjective standard is used, it has become
a popular proposal that contracts should be submitted to some
government agency for pre-approval. 23 Once blessed, the
contract would automatically be deemed in compliance with the
plain English statute. (It is usually proposed that there be no
requirement that forms be so submitted; those who elect to use
contracts not pre-approved are free to do so at their own risk.
One must assume that the risk of not obtaining such approval
could be very great indeed.)
While security can be gained from this kind of clearance, the
very process raises some fundamental risks to the attainment of
clear writing. Even more than the standardization that can result
from judicial precedent, one may fairly assume that government
22 See J.C. Redish, "Readability" in D. Felker, ed., Document Design: A Review of the
Relevant Research (Washington, D. C., American Institute for Research, 1980).
23 See s. 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1605, as amended by the Truth in
Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Title VI of P.L. 96-221.
15--6 C.B.L.J.
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agencies, by their very nature, will develop fixed concepts of what
is meant by plain English. The process of experimentation and
creativity, so essential at this point in our understanding of plain
English, could well grind to a halt. In addition, one must
seriously, or perhaps not seriously, question whether the
bureaucracy is really the place to go for good writing standards.
Efforts in the United States to bring government into the writing
process have not led to optimism. 24
Third, we turn to the question of penalties. Often insufficiently
studied when civil statutes are drafted, a proper penalty structure
may be a core element in achieving a workable plain English law.
When Assemblyman Peter Sullivan drafted the New York law, he
appreciated the problems inherent in a statute of this type. He
frequently said that his goal was to create a "climate" in which
better contracts would be written. At the same time, he wanted to
avoid the threatened torrent of litigation in which courts would sit
like English instructors grading papers. For this reason, he delib-
erately inserted a low penalty structure into the New York
statute. Individual violations cost $50; maximum class action
penalties are $10,000; violation of the statute does not void the
contract; perhaps most important of all, there is no award of costs
or attorney's fees to a successful consumer plaintiff. In the eyes of
many, including myself, Sullivan achieved his goal. Virtually all
contracts in New York were rewritten as of November 1, 1978.
Since then, there has been almost no litigation. Undoubtedly, the
low penalties have provided insufficient incentive to bring the
nuisance cases. There are those who believe this is not entirely
desirable and that many justified cases have also not been
brought. 25 This may be true. Nevertheless, lawyers writing
consumer contracts in New York today do so with simplicity and
communicativeness as prime goals. Many companies employ
language consultants and, as we shall see, even the design of
contracts has become significant. This is a major step in the right
direction and perhaps that is enough to ask of a statute of this
type.
24 The effective date of New Jersey's plain English law was deferred pending decisions by
the state agencies on how they will measure compliance. See Newark Star-Ledger,
August 25, 1981.
25 The Committee on Consumer Affairs of the Bar Association of the City of New York
recognized this as a potential problem in its review of the New York law, March 1978,
but believed that the novel and experimental law was acceptable in this form.
[Vol. 6
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Real Plain English
Having participated in the early efforts to achieve plain
English, I regret that it has become principally an exercise in
language. In drafting the early forms, it was apparent that good
language was only part of the process. Actually, the achievement
of plain English consumer contracts really involved three
separate steps.
The first was an analysis of substance. We know that rarely is a
contract drafted solely for the specific transaction in which it is
used. Lawyers regularly start with forms either from their files,
from a law book or purchased from a printing company. The
traditional process is then to add to these forms whatever is
required for the transaction at hand. Writing in this way, lawyers
are more skilled at addition than subtraction. It is both easier and
safer to have more rather than less. The process results in longer
forms and longer forms are harder to read. The first step in
rewriting the Citibank promissory note and the good plain
English contracts that followed it was a close analysis of the
substance of the form and a determination of what was really
needed and what could be considered surplus in the particular
transactions for which the form would be used. This was not an
easy process. It required the collaboration of lawyers (to analyze
legal implications) and businessmen (to confirm practical need).
Reasonable risk taking had to be evaluated. Naturally, judgments
differed. Business officers responsible for marketing often had
different views from those responsible for the collection process.
The difficult process, however, yielded results. Without elimi-
nation of well over half the form, simplification could not have
been achieved.
Language, of course, was the second step in the exercise. The
third, however, proved equally important. To deliver its message
most forcefully, the document had to be well designed. Profes-
sionals were used for this purpose. Upon reflection, the lawyers
realized that design was actually a traditional element of contract
law. Many cases refused enforcement of contractual provisions,
even well written, when buried in fine print or located in unlikely
places. 26 It may be that design has always been an element of
contract law although it has not been so identified in the treatises.
26 See J.D. Calamari, "Duty to Read -a Changing Concept", 43 Ford. L.R. 341 (1974).
1981-82]
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Unfortunately, it is difficult for plain English statutes to control
what exists in the substance of a contract. We hope, however,
that the message of the early forms will not be lost. We do see
elements of design creeping into the enacted statutes and
proposed bills. Even the caption-and-division provision of the
New York statute is really a design direction. Other statutes and
bills contain provisions as to type size, contrasts, margins etc. 27
The Future of Plain English
One may fairly anticipate that the number of statutes requiring,
in one form or another, the use of plain English will increase.
Whether legislation will go much beyond the seven states which
have already passed laws is difficult to say. One can also antic-
ipate that the use by business of better language, better analyzed
substance and better designed contracts will also increase.
Perhaps the most interesting question is what the effect of all of
this upon the consumer body will be.
Ultimately, the goal of plain English should be to change
behavior. If the clearer, briefer and more attractive contracts
simply lead to the same consumer behavior as the older, less
understandable forms, one cannot be sure that the game has been
worth the candle. It must be acknowledged that little change in
consumer behavior has yet been perceived as a result of the new
forms. But this may be too much to ask at this early point. There
have, however, been other discernible results. The older
contracts tended to contain provisions that even the businesses
using them, upon examination, agreed were excessive. Displayed
in plain English they had to go. Businesses that nurtured their
images through carefully written advertisements and customer
programmes could not risk those images through the now visible
terms of their agreements. The most important single effect of the
plain English movement has, therefore, probably been the
general amelioration of consumer contracts.
That we have not yet seen a change in actual consumer
behavior may be disappointing but it is also understandable.
Consumers have been well trained not to read the contracts they
27 Type size requirements appear in many states' laws. See N.Y. C.P.L.R., s. 4544; Ill.
Retail Installment Sales Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. Chapter 1211/2, s. 503. A conspicuousness
requirement appears in the Uniform Commercial Code, s. 2-316 (2) and a ten point type
size requirement in Securities Act Regulations 230.425.
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sign. Not only did the appearance of the contracts repel the
ordinary reader but the usual language defied understanding by
all but experts. Even for them, reading was a difficult chore. As
the language of contracts becomes more available to the lay
reader there is reason to believe that this will change. One may
imagine a new generation of consumers, looking at a store's
revolving credit contracts for information in the same way that
they examine the store's catalogues. Bank agreements may be
read as often and as intelligently as the bank's advertisements.
Then, there must be reactive behaviour. If this occurs, the great
benefit of the plain English movement will be in its power to
redress the imbalance so often noted between consumers and the
companies that supply them with their goods and services.
Comment on The Plain English Movement
David S. Cohen*
On first impression, the private and social benefits of plain
English contracts and perhaps of plain English legislation seem
obvious. Theoretically, by using contracts drafted in simple
language we may increase consumer comprehension of
contractual terms, engender more accurate contract decision-
making, and promote more precise pricing of contract goods.
Perhaps consumers who understand their contractual obligations
will be more likely to fulfil them. Commercial goodwill may
flower, and the use of plain English contracts has been advertised
as a selling tool.' This approach to plain English, which reflects
the views of Mr. Felsenfeld, fails to address or to analyze
thoroughly several major assumptions and implications of plain
English contracts.
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that plain
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
1 The argument has been made that the voluntary decision by many commercial enter-
prises to adopt plain English contracts is a thinly disguised attempt to increase their
respective market shares. See Black, "A Model Plain Language Law"; 33 Stan. L. Rev.
255 (1981), at pp. 263-4.
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